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Of Panjandrums, Pooh Bahs, Parvenus,
and Prophets:
Law, Religion, and Medical Science

This monograph derives from a lecture—under the same title—given, originally, in
honor of Justice Michael D. Kirby, AC, CMG, High Court of Australia, in the Banco Court
of The Supreme Court Building, Queen’s Square, Sydney, Australia, on July 27, 2005, and
in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Division of Law at
Macquarie University.
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I met Justice Kirby when I visited Australia in 1984 and I especially remember hearing him
speak for the first time, in his capacity as Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, in
the Hall at St. Andrew’s Cathedral in downtown Sydney. As I recall, the focus of his remarks was
on the significance of God and religion in the life of the law in a Nation not overwhelmingly
religious as say, Poland. Particular interest was paid to the “significance” or “relevance” of God’s
name in the Courtroom Oath.
I now return to the 1984 theme—but in the specific context of the interrelated roles law, religion,
and medical science have in shaping normative standards in this the Age of Biotechnology.
I remember attending a lecture given by Professor Margo Somerville of McGill University
entitled, rather mischievously, (as Margo is wont to do with her titles), “Doctors, Ethics, and
Dropping Dead” in the Great Hall at the University of Sydney in 1990. Margo took several minutes
to explain what was and was not meant by the title, itself, and added a few disclaimers. I, too, wish
to explain my title, as well as the placement of the words in the subtitle. I will then have a
disclaimer or two as well.
First off, lest some of you think there is a da Vinci-like code in the title, and that it describes
roles or names that Justice Kirby has—at one time or other in his career—been called, I wish to
advise otherwise. While, in fact, he certainly has been termed both a prophet1 of law reform and law
in action—as well as a parvenu2 or upstart by others for his positions, I doubt that he could be
thought of, strictly, as a panjandrum3 but very probably a pooh bah.4 The Oxford English Dictionary
defines the former as a pretender5—a futurist, to be sure, but, Justice Kirby is never a pretender.
Although an afficionado of Gilbert and Sullivan, I am unknowing whether, in his “salad days,” he
ever played the role of Pooh Bah, the Lord High Everything Else, in the Mikado (or, The Town of
Titipu). In any event, the Oxford English Dictionary, again, defines a pooh bah as a person with
much influence.6 There can be no question that Justice Kirby has, indeed, established a real, positive
global influence.

While, as I acknowledge forthwith that my title of this monograph was not meant, originally, to
describe real or imaginary qualities or appellations given to the good Justice, it could perhaps—upon
1

additional reflection and depending upon one’s temperament and sense of humor—apply, in reality,
to him to one degree or other. I leave it to each reader and Justice Kirby, himself, to resolve this
issue.
What I had in mind, originally, in shaping, first, the title, was to test the extent to which law,
religion, and medicine play out their roles, interchangeably, as panjandrums, parvenus, pooh bahs,
and prophets—and with what results. The placement of religion in the middle of the subtitle is
significant because, as I shall show in this monograph, religion acts as a bridge in stabilizing both
law and medical science.
I write as a nondenominational Christian pilgrim. When I gave a set of Fulbright Foundation
Lectures in 1984 here in Australia through the good offices of the University of New South Wales
as its Visiting Professor of Law and Medical Jurisprudence, I was—invariably—taken to be a priest;
I think probably because of my University affiliation in America. In Tasmania, I was even asked
if I was a member of the episcopacy. I was neither then, nor am I today, a priest or bishop!

A Tribute to Justice Kirby
Termed one of the “liveliest minds” in the field of law reform by Lord Scarman,7 and seen by
Sir Zelman Cowan as an “able popularizer” who “brings great learning, great breath of vision and
a lively social awareness”8 to the law, Justice Kirby has re-enforced the power of his legal
knowledge by ad through the wisdom of his judicial judgments and the effectiveness of the
exposition of his philosophy both in and out of court—demonstrating, consistently, both courage
and tenacity.
Acknowledged as early as 1990 as one of the thirteen men and women of the Australian
Continent who has made a significant and enduring contribution to the growth of Australia as a
Nation,9 Justice Kirby has continued, both nationally and internationally, to present—and thus
advance—Australia as a Nation in the vanguard of progress in the administration of justice and
especially so in Medical Jurisprudence.

The Editors of WHO’S WHO IN AUSTRALIA, 2005, have summed up neatly Justice Kirby’s
life in 68 lines.10 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
devotes 24 paragraphs to present his biography.11 The internet web page for the High Court lists,
2

since 1999, ten pages (in rather small print) of Justice Kirby’s papers, lectures and essays.12
We also know that, during his tenure thus far on the High Court, as well as that time during his
tenure as President of the Court of Appeal, he enjoys the status of being the all-time record holder
for being in dissent.13
It would surely be presumptuous of me to select one achievement or honor which might be
defining or foundational in Justice Kirby’s illustrious career. But, if I were emboldened to hazard
a guess, in addition to his Presidency of the Australian Law Reform Commission and subsequent
elevation to the bench, first at the Court of Appeal and then the High Court of Australia, I would
suggest the award of “Call Me God” honors by Queen Elizabeth in1983 (or the Commander of St.
Michael and St. George as it is officially known) and the conferral of the Companion of Australia
in 1991 are significant achievements. His Chancellorship of Macquarie University and awardance
of an honorary LL.D. degree from it are also sources of pride as was the awardance, in 1991, of the
Australian Human Rights Medal and in 1998 the Laureate of the UNESCO Prize for Human Rights
Education.14
If I had been on the editorial board of WHO’S WHO IN AUSTRALIA or THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT, in addition to the biographical entries, I would have added:
Pathfinder; Futurist; Dreamer; Visionary; Idealist; Noble and Compassionate Christian and Person
of Goodwill; Judicial Gardener;15 Humanitarian; Exemplar of Civility and Professionalism; Eloquent
and Patient Teacher; Informed and Courteous Polemicist; Champion of Civil Rights, Sexual
Integrity and Equality and, finally, Valued Friend.
Justice Kirby has led, and continues to lead, a great life of the mind and the spirit; a life
dedicated to doing “justice according to law to all manner of people without fear or favour, affection
or ill-will”16 and a judicial life tempered further with the desire to break free from the shackles of
strict ad complete legalism that, in 1967, marked Australia judges as “dogmatic conservatives.”17
By so acting, this response will bring to bear an acknowledgment, by the judiciary, of the
importance of changing social conditions in their judicial analysis and decision making.18 With this
acknowledgment comes a co-ordinate need to study and to see the law in action—as distinct from
“law in the books”—with the goal being to effect institutional law reform by evaluating the actual
social effects of the legal institutions, legal precepts and legal doctrines.19 Indeed, law needs to be
viewed “from the outside” or through the world’s eye if it is to be seen as progressive and not
3

regressive.20
In Michael Kirby, one finds, then, the quintessential judicial role model who follows the
admonition of Socrates to hear courteously, answer wisely, consider soberly and decide
impartially.21 And, in following this course, Justice Kirby has truly lived, and continues to live, in
the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, “greatly in the law as well as elsewhere.”22
From virtually the beginning of his public career in the Australian Law Reform Commission,
Justice Kirby was called upon to address vital and complex issues in health law and ethics. Indeed,
it may be seen that the whole national debate of how best to renew the legal system in order to
ensure its fairness accessibility and continued relevance in The Age of The New Biomedical
Technology was begun on his “watch.”23
Dealing first in 1977 with law reform in the field of human tissue transplants, he was forced—of
necessity—to study the need to re-define death, the feasibility of adopting a regime of organ
donation or one of the taking, with an opting out privilege, the acceptability of payment for body
parts, the availability of donations by minors, the rights of relatives to override the wishes of a
deceased to donate body parts for either research or organ donation, together with legal and ethical
issues of the then rather novel process and procedure of in vitro fertilization and the scope of genetic
engineering. Medical confidentiality and privacy in medical information, child abuse reporting and
other cutting edge issue were studied subsequently.24
More recently, Justice Kirby has applied his boundless energies and keen interests to tackling
ethical and legal questions surrounding the HIV/AIDS pandemic, UNESCO’s work on the Human
Genome Project and the need for protections of human rights for homosexual and bisexual men and
women, drug users and drug dependent persons and those infected with HIV/AIDS and, finally,
shaping ethical principles to be used as guides for charting health care allocative schemes through
the application of cost-benefit analysis.25 Indeed, as Justice Kirby has cautioned, this issue of
rational and principled apportionment of scarce medical resources, or what has been termed
distributive justice,26 is a foundational issue facing Australia

27

and the United States in this 21st

century.28

The Kirby Informing Principle or Ethic
The Informing Principle or Ethic that emerges from Justice Kirby’s work as a judge, lawyer,
4

humanitarian, and scholar—and, more often than not from his lectures and papers delivered ex
cathedra (or away from the High Court bench)—is, in one, both visionary and futuristic and
anchored in a value system termed, “Transcendent Idealism.” This set of values draws on humanism
and moral realism and represents a synthesis of what is regarded as the three primary value systems:
the human individual, society and transcendent purpose.29
In order to consider and evaluate the vexatious problem of balancing individual rights against
social authority, transcendent idealism, then, acknowledges “God’s transcendent purpose which is
concerned with the dignity and salvation of each human soul.”30 While not providing an exacting
template for resolving all socio-legal issues, it seeks to posit a “body of shared values through which
problems can be mediated.”31
The Kirby Ethic builds upon this value system and clearly embraces the foundational principle
or quality of Love set forth in St. Paul’s letter to the Corinthians.32 Indeed, it is not only the
cornerstone of the Ethic but also the yardstick by which the effectiveness of any discourse or
implementation of human rights is measured. Without its acceptance, there can be no real
appreciation or understanding of the very essence of human relations.33
Achieving a new world order which recognizes the centrality of human rights calls for a
recognition of an individual responsibility to advance the virtues of honesty, compassion, kindness,
justice and nobility of life purpose—together with an abiding respect for human goodness and
dignity and a tolerance for diversity:34 qualities found inherently (or at least ideally) within all of
us. Recognizing the dignity of one’s very own existence demands, in turn, a witnessing of that
humanity and dignity within the polity for all.35

In order to lead and support the advancement of human rights, one must be informed and
educated to the hard issues which shape current debate.36 To this end, participatory democracy—an
obligation for all citizens in democratic countries 37—must assist in promoting rational discourse in
all aspects of law, health, and biotechnology; for it is only through informed discussion that a level
of perception can be set which allows for solutions to vexatious issues.38
With the obligation to be informed is a co-ordinate responsibility, as citizens, to remember the
right to dissent (when necessary) and remember further that powerful dissenting ideas may not be
seen as either persuasive or valid in the time in which they are expressed but—over the course of
5

history—may well be recognized and even accepted ultimately as new contemporary bases, or
vectors of positive force, in the social ordering of that day.39
As pilgrims all, Justice Kirby bids us to be forever optimistic40 maintaining an idealism not only
to the future but a measured respect for that of the past.41
When there are changes in social circumstances and community attitudes, which in turn, make
old rules anachronistic, then, the Kirby Ethic holds those rules must bend in order to accommodate
change.42 In order to achieve an openness of spirit to change, interdisciplinary outreach is needed.43
To implement the Kirby Ethic judicially, it—of necessity—must morph into a principle of
judicial interpretations which holds that in cases of ambiguity, it is not only permissible, but indeed
essential, to construe Australian Statutes and the Constitution in a manner utilizing the norms of
universal human rights and law so that a reconciliation of international law and municipal law can
be effected and thereby witness the enforcement of Human Rights as a universal phenomenon.44
The Kirby Ethic eschews a rigid and almost mechanical application of case decisions over
conceptualism (or that way of considering law as a set of preferred values).45 Indeed, normative
values must be set forth in all cases of determinative decision making,46 with efforts taken to go
beyond categories of indeterminancy such as “fair” or “just” or what is rational and supportable.47
If integrated into the fabric of informed decision making by the courts, legislative bodies and the
polity, the Kirby Informing Principle or Ethic will set new parameters for discussions, action and
mediation in the perplexing issues of the New Age of Biotechnology. In a word, the Ethic will
advance a more comprehensive framework for principled analysis grounded, as it is, in honesty,
compassion, kindness, humaneness, justice and nobility of life purpose.
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Introduction, Overview and Thesis
of The Lecture
Faith, religion, spirituality and prayer have a current focused outreach and easy parlance in the
market places and public squares throughout America.1 News stories2 and court cases abound of
dramatic challenges to the placement of monuments to the Ten Commandments in public buildings
and grounds,3 the use of God’s name in school pledges of allegiance,4 the teaching of Darwinian or
evolutionary science in public education,5 the role of faith and religion in health care healing,6 the
value of affirmations of religious faith on the political hustings,7 and—internationally—the efforts
of French President Jacques Chirac to ban “overt religious symbols” in public schools in France in
an effort to maintain secularism throughout the educational system.8
This past June in England, senior executives at the University of Leicester NHS Trust,
announced the placement of Bibles in hospital bedside lockers by Gideons International—a century
old tradition—was ending because it was determined that some ethnic minorities might be offended
by this continued practice. Religious texts would be made available at hospitals through the
chaplaincy.9 At Newham General Hospital in East London a crucifix was removed from a prayer
room because it made the room too Christian and, thus, offensive to non-Christians.10
The impact that these occurrences have on the fiber of contemporary society is significant,
and—at the same time—truly incalculable. It is made more problematic because of a failure of the
system to agree, in the first instance, on a unified definition of religion.11 This situation parallels that
state which also exists in international law.12 Because of this present vacuum, it has been suggested
that in lieu of defining religion, it would be more practicable to consider it as a belief, identity, or
way of life.13 Regrettably, the law—from a national context or perspective—has not risen to the
challenge and structured an unerring definition. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has chosen
to define religion in United States v. Seeger by stating that,
[T]he test of belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme Being’ . . . is whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God. . . .14

In August, 2001, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Roy Moore, installed a two
and a half ton monument to the Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda in the
10

Alabama State Building—intending, as such, to remind the citizens of the state of his personal belief
in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church. The Federal
District Court ordered, subsequently, the removal of the monument finding its placement to be in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment to the Constitution.15 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed16 and the United States Supreme Court refused to review the case.17 While
the judicial disposition of this case is now settled,18 the issues of the extent to which the
acknowledgment and expression of religious faith, within the ambit of state action, and is consistent
with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, remains a highly vexatious matter.19
Defining the appropriate role of religion in the town square and the nation’s public buildings has,
of late, however, focused on the extent to which religious monuments may be placed appropriately
on public land.20 This has become a new, energized national issue because of the pervasive concern
that distinctive American moral values that underpinned the founding of the Nation are eroding and,
further, that society is becoming Godless.21 In addition to key cases in Alabama22 and Texas,23 it has
been reported that some two dozen disputes over the placement of monuments to the Ten
Commandments or similar displays have—since 2000—been taken to the courts for settlement.24
Early in 1980, the United States Supreme Court recognized the Ten Commandments as a “sacred
text in Jewish and Christian faiths” for which “no legislative recitation of a supposed secular
purpose can blind us to that fact.”25 It did not hold, however, that not all government uses of the
Commandments are taken as impermissible.26
Subsequently, in 1988, the High Court—while acknowledging the subtle ways in which the
values

of

the

Establishment

Clause

were

“not

susceptible

to

a

single

verbal

formulation.”27—reaffirmed its decision in Everson v. Board of Education in 194728 which structures
the modest framework for analyzing issues under the Establishment Clause.
A democratic and political process tied more to television sound bites than intelligent and
informed deliberations among its citizens is a process guaranteeing itself of lethargic inactivity if
not stagnation. It is for the judiciary to fill the breach and continue its role as interpreters of the
Common Law and when need be, architects of the new Age of Biotechnology. Ideally, when
individual cases of profound disagreement arise over issues of medical science, courts and
legislatures should remain passive and allow resolution of these disputes within each concerned
family unit and, where possible, their church community of faith.29 Oftentimes, the at-risk family
11

and its religious support groups are unable to cope with understanding the ramifications of ultimate
decisions regarding medicine. “Meditating structures”30 can only go so far in discerning and
promoting legal justice—or, the obligation to support the common good.31 The common good is
shaped by the legislatures and the courts and—ultimately—it remains for an enlightened judiciary
to interpret its course. It is regrettable, but a fact in contemporary society, that every complex moral
issue is more often than not, transformed into a legal issue.32 Since law and morality intersect in
daily life, it is not surprising that the courts are called upon to arbitrate.33 Invariably, law supports
some visions of how life should be lived within the community while, at the same time, undermining
others.34
The basic question underlying the involvement of religion in American and Australian public
life would seem to be whether a free society depends ultimately on religious values for cohesion and
of human rights.35
If Lord Devlin is correct when he concludes that it is difficult to teach morality without religion,
then the answer to this question is that free societies depend upon religion as a bedrock for stability
and social action.36
Yet, Chief Justice Murray Gleeson of the Australian High Court, reminds us that there can be
morality without religion37—for, “it is the general acceptance of values that sustains the law, and
the social behavior; not private conscience.”38 Whether this fundamental idea “is expressed in terms
of teaching, or communication, there has to be a method of getting from the level of individual belief
to the level of community values. Religion is one method of bridging the gap.”39
The purpose of this monograph, then, is to explore the conjunctive and disjunctive influences that
religion has in one specific field of current socio-political debate: namely, biomedical technology
and ethical decision making.40 More specifically, the role of religion as an equal—or, as the case
may prove to be—limited, partner with law and medical science in assessing the dimensions and
patterns of application of the new startling biotechnologies will be evaluated.
From this analysis it will be seen that far from being antagonistic to law and medicine, religion
and religious principles stabilize the field of biomedicine and serve, additionally, as vectors of force
in shaping both ethical and moral constructs for decision making.41 In turn, each of these three
disciplines complements and strengthens what should be the ultimate goal of the state namely: to
secure the happiness, spiritual tranquility and well-being of its citizens. This purpose is, in turn,
12

advanced—and thus enhanced—by safeguarding the genetic well-being and general health of its
citizens.42 Working toward this goal and meeting it eventually will have the effect of minimizing
human suffering and maximizing the social good that derives from rational and humane actions
taken to displace man’s genetic weaknesses from the line of inheritance.43

THE LECTURE
I.
A DIALOGUE BEGINS
A primary goal for many religious thinkers has been to develop a process for determining how
to lead science and technology toward a level of awareness and appreciation of human and
environmental values.44 Given the growing trend of placing and then testing scientific development
within a framework of moral understanding and normative values, the choice is “having theologians
and religious ethicists contribute a theological perspective or having scientists attempt to be moral
philosophers.”45
The foundational texts of most religious communities, as well as scripture itself, do not address
the complex issues of biotechnology and molecular biology. While the religious texts do establish
broad ethical norms for purposeful living, the task becomes one of adapting a mechanism for them
to apply to the biomedical issues of contemporary society; in other words, how to re-shape and, thus,
modernize them into a constructive dialogue with science—one which escapes the confines of
abstract applications and offers specific guidance and modern ethical norms for resolving concrete
biomedical conflicts.46
Whether it is practical to pursue the development of a common framework for morality and
ethical analysis within the context of the New Biology, is problematic.47 Advocates of post
modernism argue that a “Christian rather than denominational approach to bioethics” is to be
preferred. Whatever course is followed, the challenge remains the same: namely, how to show—and
thereby attempt to restate—the relevance of these religious principles to a skeptical secular society.48

In an effort to address the basic theological and ethical issues associated with the new medicoscience technologies and, thus, engage the issue, much study have been undertaken over the years
by various ecumenical and denominational bodies beginning in 1973 with the efforts of The World
13

Council of Churches to study the ethical significance of science and technology.49 Through the
succeeding years, various other studies were commissioned by various organizations such as the
World Conference on Faith and Science and The Future. Interestingly, their findings were never
granted any official standing but merely accepted as the views of each study panel.50 The Roman
Catholic Church did—however—in 1987, begin to both clarify and shape the official dialogue for
its members through the issuance of its “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on
the Dignity of Life.”51
All too often, a recitation of traditional beliefs is set forth without an interpretation of their
implications for scientific applications.52 While of marginal universal significance, these faith-based
denominational efforts nonetheless provide a rich opportunity for education and interaction as well
as for the development of a broader-based perspective on the religious, moral and ethical
ramifications of the New Biology.53 Only time will tell whether these “seedlings” will take root
from these critical engagements and provide normative values for biomedical decision making.
As the astonishing positive successes of genetic research and engineering and of genetic
medicine continue to be charted with clarity, the role of moral theology—grounded in various faith
traditions—should be used to frame guidelines for determining if and when various specific
applications of these technologies, within an appropriate ethical context, may be utilized. Richard
McCormick suggested the controlling consideration should be, “Will this or that intervention (or
omission, exception, policy, law) promote or undermine” the integrity of the human person.54
The central concern of Fr. Richard A. McCormick is the integrity of personhood. For him,
personhood begins at conception and, accordingly, would be violated by human stem cell
experimentation, cloning, and generally, in vitro fertilization.55 In this regard, McCormick is
micro—as opposed to macro—in his viewpoint. Long range or societal benefits from scientific
advances of this nature and other genetic research are of secondary concern.
Drawing upon a contemporary interpretation of tikkun olam—or the mandate to participate in
an active partnership in the repair and perfection of the world—the Jewish community supports
scientific discoveries and human applications of genetic research.56

And, interestingly for

Presbyterians, “prophetic inquiry” directs that they endeavor to utilize modern technology and
science in affirming the dynamic character of the creation through the teachings and interpretations
of the biblical tradition.57
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Law and policy making as well as administrative and judicial decision making should
not—indeed, cannot—favor one denominational theology over another. Rather, balanced decisions
must be made incorporating, when appropriate, moral, ethical (e.g., religious) values with scientific
objectives for individual growth and societal advancement. When cases or issues for consideration
arise, they are just that: individual and fact sensitive. Yet, nevertheless, their evaluation can be
undertaken by a template shaped by a balancing of costs versus benefit: use or non use—all designed
to achieve a positive, just good.
No substantive resolutions are needed. The role for the various church theologies should be,
rather, “interrogative.”58 For any dialogue between science and religion to be effective, “fallibilism”
must then be an acknowledged given. In other words, both parties need to accept the proposition
that they may not only be incorrect in their understandings of each other, but “in their inferences
about the implications of their positions, in their development of their own arguments and even in
some basic claims they have never questioned.”59

Love and Justice
While there are differences between a legal order, system of morality and set of religious beliefs,
it does not follow that contemporary legal order does not contain elements of moral religious
beliefs.60 All laws are norms set within a hierarchy whose foundation is to be found in love; for it
is within the primary form of love that justice is found.61 Indeed, Augustine saw the ethics of love
as the essence of justice.62

For him, without the ethics of love, there could be no true

orderliness—this, because nature would be disturbed by man’s wilfulness.63 “Without love there
could be no justice for there would be lacking a cogent motive, and pattern, for men to render to
other men their due. . . .without love as a gift of God’s grace man could not love the proper things
properly.”64 In addition to including rules and concepts, law is—at its most basic level—but a set
of relationships among people.65
Despite the obvious tensions or discontinuities between law and religion, one cannot truly
flourish without the other. Without religion, law degenerates into little more than a mechanical
legalism; and religion without law loses its social effectiveness.66

Justice
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Any use of biotechnology brings with it the ever-present problem of how to distribute its benefits
justly and fairly among various social groups.67 Presently, the vast majority of distributional
problems are decided on a local ad hoc basis. Because demand will normally exceed supply, the
threshold question becomes, for example: Who should receive a kidney transplant, an artificial heart,
or become a candidate for gene therapy? What is the fairest principle for distribution—first come,
first served or medical compatibility? Should equal access to health care be recognized as an
important social goal? To what extent is there an inequitable distribution of biomedical research
risks to the institutionalized? Finally, is it unjust to distribute health care as a free market
commodity or consider the social utility of persons in distributing scarce medical services? No
definitive answers can be postulated.68 Indeed, as Richard McCormick has cautioned, the operative
watchwords should be: “beware of ethicists bearing solutions!”69 Anyone claiming to have
explicable rules that cut through the philosophical agonies of ambiguity and uncertainty in our
present pluralistic society is guilty of deception.70 “All too often the question of how to distribute
justly often is reduced to who shall decide ow to distribute.”71
Although wide social consensus will never be achieved on developing a framework for resolving
difficult medical issues of the New Biology (simply because the criterion of final selection will vary
with the nature of the medical dilemma or particular biomedical technology used), policies that aid
decision making can and must be advanced. Such a set of policies must be formulated not only to
provide protection for the vulnerable, while respecting familial and personal autonomy and privacy,
but also to recognize inherent common values and not so much the centrality of technical expertise.
Such values foster humility as well as tolerance and grace.72

The UNESCO Effort
Even though uncertainities plague bioethical decisionmaking, a much needed framework for
action is being advanced by UNESCO: first, in its Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights73 and, presently, through a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics (or,
alternatively, a Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights).74
Both of these documents show, with striking clarity, the unstable guiding spirit of Justice Kirby’s
draftmanship as a pivotal member of the International Bioethics Committee; for, the need to respect
human dignity and defend it when human genetic research is referenced repeatedly in the Universal
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Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights75 as well as in the Declaration on Universal
Norms on Bioethics.76 This, then, is an over-arching principle in both instruments: to accord respect
for “human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms,” and thus effectuate a Principle of
Social Responsibility to advance “the common good” by providing access to health care.”77

A Shared Tradition
There are four elements shared by law and religion: ritual, tradition, authority and universality.78
Within every religion is found two legal elements—one which relates to the social processes of the
particular community sharing a faith and the other “to the social processes of the larger community
of which the religious community is a part.”79 Indeed, it has been suggested that the two major
dimensions of man’s social life may be seen as law and religion even though, as such, they are
dialectically interdependent vectors of force.80
In the final analysis, perhaps it is best to see law as a way in which both justice and love are
translated into complex social situations within various communities.81 Since love is situational, it
has been argued persuasively that it—rather than binding rules and a priori principles—should
direct moral responses (micro and macro) at all levels of decision making in issues of the New
Biology.82 Accordingly, the standard of humane treatment in end-of-life cases should be shaped and
guided by love just as scientific decisions regarding the suitability of investigation. In one case, the
construct is personal and in the other it is communitarian.83

Values
Lord Cooke of Thorndon has observed that at the High Court, the constant choice facing the
court “requires, in the ultimate, a weighing of values.”84 Yet, interestingly, there are no
rational grounds for determining one set of value over another; for, one’s beliefs and values simply
exist outside the domain of reason.85
Law and the values of society, then, may be thought correctly of as sharing a symbiotic
relationship; this, because without the cement of common values to fortify and strengthen it, law is
sterile.86 Conversely, for a society to be without direction and constraint makes it as a society
without power to protect itself from the unscrupulous.87 If law is at odds with society’s values, it
runs the risk of falling into disrepute.88
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Since differing values lead to differing principles, it remains for the law to ascribe to those
principles which “reflect a consensus value capable of articulation as a normative proposition from
which it is possible to reason logically and analogically.”89
Aristotle, in Book 1 of his Nichomachean Ethic, states that every action and choice aims “at
some good.”90 In contemporary society, that good could well be economic, ethical, medical, moral,
philosophical, physical, political, religious, social or spiritual. For the Greek Stoics, one of their
essential obligations in life was acceptance of the maxim that, “what you do not wish to be done to
you, do not do to anyone else.”91
It remained for Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount to re-state this ideal or standard of normative
conduct and urge rather that one should, “Do to others what you would have them do to you;”92 and
thus emerged what has been termed the Golden Rule.93
Modernly, it could be argued that drawing upon—and thereby restating John Rawl’s Principle
of Intergenerational Justice94—a “new” Golden Rule or operational standard for scientific
advancement and legal containment thereof—could be posited. As such, the Principle would state
simply that the present generation should do unto the next generation as we would (or should) do
unto ourselves. And this, I think, is but a natural complement to the broader Kirby Ethic that I have
postulated.

Legal Directions
Often, the law has responded or reacted to, rather than directed, an agenda for social needs and
demands. Indeed, the former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Warren E. Burger,
once observed: “Law does not search out as do science and medicine; it reacts to social needs and
demands.”95 Law, science, and medicine must become full, unlimited partners in the bioethical
ventures of modern society. They must march in unison as they approach the task of assuring the
primary goal of society itself: namely, that all citizens be provided with an equal opportunity to
achieve their maximum potential for human growth, development, interpersonal relations, and
intellectual fulfillment within the economic marketplace as well as the marketplace of ideas, and to
have not only their physical suffering minimized and their spiritual tranquility assured, but also to
have their rights of autonomy and/or self-determination recognized.96
In the 1960 Julius Rosenthal Lecture, “The Law and Its Compass,” delivered at the Northwestern
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University Law School, Cyrile John Radcliffe, Lord Radcliffe, suggested that the law needs a “point
of reference more universal than its own internal logic.”97
The layman insists that the law “stand for something more, for some vindication of a sense of
right and wrong that is not merely provisional or just the product of a historical process, but is rooted
in that great tradition” of individual freedom and humane civilization that has procedural the
“institutions” of our modern “liberal world.” That, then, is “the compass of the law must steer by.”98
This, indeed, is the Kirby compass. And one that sees law as the center force or point of direction
for “stability, conservatives and predictability in society.”99
Justice Windeyer opined in 1970, long before the pace of medical and biotechnological science
had quickened to the level of achievement today, that the law was not keeping pace with medicine
and, indeed, marched “in the rear,” limping along.100 Nowadays, as Justice Kirby has observed, “this
observation seems positively charitable.”101
Since human behavior is “the very currency in which law deals,”102 it follows that the law should
intensify its efforts to understand the causes of human behavior and thereby seek to increase its
overall effectiveness and efficiency.103 All too often, in the science of behavioral biology, it is
routinely “ignored, misunderstood, or improperly invoked.”104 Inasmuch as law is about changing
behavior, then, sound behavioral models must be used in developing new laws in this the Age of
Biotechnology. Interdisciplinary outreach as an element in the Kirby Ethic, again, becomes
fundamental.

II.
A CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY
Ever since America was founded, the national symbol has been an eagle supported in its flights
and its destiny by two powerful wings: plain reason or common sense and humble faith.105 The
founding generation drew its common sense from not only the traditional wisdom of ancient
philosophers and moralists, but from the scriptures;106 for, it was evidence to them that a faith in the
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob was an ideal magnification of human reason.107 Indeed, for the
founders, of all philosophies and religions, Judaism and Christianity served as the best unified
foundation for republican institutions because they encouraged virtue and sharpened a zest for
liberty.108
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From the very beginning of the Nation, the “dominant metaphor for church-state relations was
that public officials must act as ‘nursing fathers’ to the religious and moral habits of the people . .
.”109 Put simply, as a religious people, the majority of early Americans believed wholeheartedly that
they owed their liberty to their creator.110
In the United States Constitution, the action to separate church from state was driven
significantly by the same recognition that religion concerns itself with differing senses or levels of
reality than those of the political world.111 Accordingly, two clauses in the First Amendment
enunciate with clarity the boundaries of church and state—the Establishment Clause forbids the
government from making any “law respecting the establishment of religion,” and the Free Exercise
of Religion Clause prohibits the government from restricting religious belief or practice.112 While
these two clauses, especially the second one, are taken in contemporary society as affirming rights
of individual conscience together with the appropriateness of eligious pluralism, there is strong
historical evidence suggesting however that the framers were more interested in recognizing the
establishment of religious duties free from state interference.113
Drawing upon these two clauses Section 116 of the Australian Constitution states:
‘The Commonwealth shall not make any law [(i)] for establishing any religion, or
[(ii)] for imposing any religious observance, or [(iii)] for prohibiting the free exercise
of any religion, and [(iv)] no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any
office or public trust under the Commonwealth.114
One of two driving and very practical forces behind the crafting of the religion clauses in the
First Amendment in America was an evangelical conviction that religion—and not just individual
conscience—was to control a limited government that in turn must be subordinate to a sovereign
God. A second fundamental conviction undergirding the separation of church and state was that the
state should, quite simply, be secular and not religious. It was this unyielding view that was in direct
opposition to the Republican belief that the state should support religion in order to promote public
morality. It was mainly on the arguments that, for the sake of religious integrity, religion should be
insulated from state support, that the secular view of the state triumphed in the Establishment
Clause.115

Religion’s Role
20

The role of religion in a constitutional democracy is, surely, at the apex of current legal and
social debate.116 Since questions about religion involve moral issues, they are presented regularly
both to the courts and to the legislatures. And, furthermore, since these two bodies are not
“philosophically reflective enough to deal with moral issues which are integral to debates on
religious issues,”117 difficulties in meaning, interpretation and application are a given. Under these
circumstances, it could be viewed as improper to demand of the state that it be subject always to “the
higher law of God.”118 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that since the “bedrock of moral order
is religion,” politics and morality can only be viewed as inseparable.119 Interestingly, today political
activists now include religious believers who seek not only to shape public policy but often to seize
state power.120
If the proposition is advanced that only religion provides morality with a foundation,121 then it
follows that religion may be taken as an “independent moral force” in American society.122
Yet, the extent of its independence remains a complex and volatile issue. While some religions
advance civic responsibility as a noble virtue and set high levels of moral performance in daily life,
others stress a form of political withdrawal and personal passivity and, still others, are obsessive and
fanatical.123

Historically, however, religion is seen as an associative force that serves to strengthen moral
solidarity as well as political attachment.124 This is seen dramatically in the work of various
communities of faith where strong welfare organizations are developed which, in turn, draw upon
high levels of popular participation in promoting multiple forms of everyday assistance.125
In an effort to understand the evolution of religion, recent study has yielded a new postulation:
namely, that memes, as transmittable units of culture (found, for example in songs, poems and
fashions), advance religion from generation to generation. Memes, framed from the word gene, by
geneticist Richard Dawkins, are learned by instruction and imitation. They may or may not be
beneficial to those holding them and serve only to the extent that they are transmitted effectively
from person to person.126 Under this theory, then, culture—rather than biology—is responsible for
the transmission of religious memes.

The Law of Religion in Australia
21

and Other Considerations
Although Cicero is thought to have been responsible for attempting to define religion,127 today
the courts continue to grapple with a contemporary definition. A commonly accepted lay definition
of the term states that a religion “means belief that the totality of existence includes objective overall
purpose or significance beyond pure reason or the senses.128
The High Court of Australia did not deal directly and definitively with this issue until 1983 in
the case of Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vict).129 Here, it overturned
two appeal decisions of the Supreme Court of Victoria which had held, in essence, that—under the
Victorian Payroll Tax Act of 1971—the Church of the New Faith, formed to promote Scientology,
was not a religious institution whose ways were exempt for payroll tax under the Act.
In the three judgments in Church of the New Faith, two were written jointly—the first by Chief
Justice Mason and Justice Brennan, the second by Justice Murphy and the third by Justices Wilson
and Deane. All three judgments attempt to define, and thereby interpret, religion.130
For the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan, theism is not an essential element of religion. Rather,
“it is belief in a supernatural being, thing or principle” and “the acceptance of conduct to give effect
to that body.”131 Thus, religion not only encompasses conduct but belief as well. Indeed, beliefs,
practices, and observances are all central to this analysis.132
For Justice Murphy, casting his judicial net as far as possible, results in testing the validity of
a religion’s claim that it truly a religion by, broadly, evaluating the centrality of its position and
whether it proposes a way to achieve purpose in life. Accordingly, “Any body which attempts to
be religious and offers a way to find meaning and purpose in life is religious.133
The third judgment, authored by Justice Wilson and Deane, references its foundation to then
current meanings of the word, religion, in the United States and thereby presents as much broader
template for analysis which may be thought of as somewhere between the previous judgments in the
case at bar.134

Under their opinion, a range of indicia test is used in the ultimate

determination—among them being whether the claimed religion espouses a belief in the supernatural
or ideas relating to man’s inherent nature and peace within the universe and advances among its
identifiable group followers, particular standards of behavior having supernatural significance and,
furthermore, that the adherents of the religion maintain their practices or ideas in fact constitute a
religion.135
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Indeterminacy and Extra-Legal Norms
When hard cases arise in the law and relevant statutes, common law, contracts or constitutional
law provisions, do not clearly resolve a dispute in question, a state of indeterminacy results.136
Exactly how this is to be resolved remains unclear. Some argue that noncomprehensive extra-legal
norms such as religious views may “guide”—and only guide—judicial decisonmaking in such
cases.137 Others contend judges have a right to include religious sources when justifying decisions
even though such values are not shared universally138 or even by the litigants. Still others suggest
judges must always first seek to develop an analysis that follows a secular model—except in those
cases involving issues of human worth where religious arguments may then be considered.139
The nature and extent to which interdisciplinary or extra legal normative outreaches should be
tolerated remains problematic. Suffice it to suggest that contemporary law in action would
incorporate the Kirby Ethic and allow religious values, when pertinent to the resolution of a
particular case, to be allowed so long as they are acknowledged specifically as being a part of the
judicial analysis of a case at bar.140 Whenever existing legal authority proves inadequate,
conscientious exploration dictates a judge search out the real bases of legal principle and legal
policy—whatever grounding they may have.141
A new Associated Press survey of ten countries—the United States, Australia, Britain, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, South Korea and Spain—regarding their attitudes toward faith and
secularism, found nearly all U.S. respondents saying faith was important to them—with only two
percent acknowledging that they did not believe in God.142 Australians, in keeping with their lax
attendance at church services,143 were generally split over the importance of faith in their lives.144
Two-thirds of the South Koreans and Canadians polled said religion was central to their lives.
Interestingly, Australians, South Koreans and Canadians were united, however, on one major point:
they were all strongly opposed to mixing religion and politics.145
Interestingly, other polls have revealed that approximately 85 percent of Americans identify with
a religious faith and more than 40 percent attend religious services at least once a week making the
United States—with the exception of Iceland and Poland—the most religious nation in the Free
World.146

Political Underpinnings
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Religions, and the moral theologies attendant to them, have a decidedly political character.147
Indeed, Judaism, Christianity and Islam are regarded, in the main, as political. While being
prophetic, they have sought nevertheless, and continue to seek, to challenge the socio-political status
quo and attack the economic inequalities of society as well as endeavor to protect the sick and
unhealthy and be a voice for the abused and other marginalized interest groups.148
When ecumenical political dialogue is engaged, it is a significant and positive undertaking
because it provides a forum where citizens and members of faith communities can seek consensus
or more often to merely diminish dissension or simply clarify issues of common disagreement, “but
always to cultivate the bonds of political community, by reaffirming their ties to one another, in
particular their shared commitment to certain authoritative politico-moral premises.”149
Often defined as a Christian nation, America still advocates a discursive type of religious
pluralism.150 Allowing, indeed tolerating, an open debate on religion itself becomes the short run
or immediate goal. When, however, religion does not inform the debate, but rather undergirds it,
the central concern is the extent to which “belief or nonbelief in a God makes the difference in one’s
normative stance.”151
A distinct feature of modernity is the notion that law is totally secular, without a founding God
and, thus, independent of any divine command other than the force of human reason152 which is, of
necessity, directed toward the establishment of intelligible order.153 A contrary view suggests,
“everyone must invoke some God or other because . . . everyone has to speak normatively”—for
participation in any public activity calls for an acknowledgment of the need for law. 154
No doubt, the central question to be posited today is: In a constitutional democracy defining
itself as a secular polity, can religion ever be represented as the basis of the rule of law?155 Can the
law’s secular legitimacy be derived from religious principles, values, moral teachings or practices
apart from validating a specific historical religion?156 Finally, does moral adherence to a body of
law require belief in a God or not?157 Throughout most of recorded human history, there has always
been a connection between God and the law.158 For example, the all inclusive name the Bible uses
for “God” is elohim which means “authority”—first, divine and secondarily, human.159
Whatever the template for contemporary analysis is tied to—a convenantal theology of the Bible,
Platonic natural law, Hobbesian natural law or a philosophically informed morality seen in the
English Common Law—in America, “the majority of the citizens believe themselves obligated by
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a prior, divine morality, despite the fact that most of them are unable to argue for it theoretically.”160
It is for the philosophers and moral theologians to make these arguments.161

III.
CHRISTIAN THOUGHT
AND EVOLUTION
While Charles Darwin’s ORIGIN OF SPECIES first appeared in 1859 and advanced a theory
of organic evolution, arguing—as such—current living species evolved from pre-existing species,
more than a century earlier a French naturalist, Chevalier de Lamarck, advanced a theory of
progressive evolutionary development derived from “vital forces within living things and the
inheritance of acquired characteristics.”162 Rather than accept Lamarck’s theory that the process of
natural selection was driven by a benign process of individual adaption, Darwin postulated a
“survival of the fittest” process in evolutionary development. Indeed, the central feature of
Darwinism became the concept of natural selection.163
For the Christian world at that time, the ultimate challenge of Darwinism to it was stated thusly:
“Beneficial variation was random and natural selection cruel. If nature reflected the character of its
creator, then the God of a Darwinian world acted randomly and cruelly.”164 The Darwinian theory
of a mindless process of natural selection suggests a universe not only blind to life and humanity but
totally indifferent to its operation.165 Yet, within this theory was found the elements of what is
termed “evolution theodicy.” This, in turn, gave rise to a movement that advocated the acceptance
of God’s aloofness or separation from natural evil and thus stood outside a strictly scientific
framework of analysis but instead was wed to metaphysical presuppositions about the nature of
God.166
Interestingly, while philosophy and science have always been influenced by theology—and
especially so with evolutionary theory—evolutionists deny steadfastly the influence.167 Yet, as
observed, a central metaphysical presupposition infuses the whole of the technical ordering of
evolutionary science: namely, that evolution’s success is tied to a doctrine of God. In other words,
“It is a theological view that preceded evolution historically and became the metaphysical landscape
on which the theory was constructed.”168 Today, one of the leading authorities in the field has
suggested that the process of evolution should be seen within an historical context which, in turn,
25

serves as an enhanced guide to understanding nature.169
It is thought that evolutionary information comes from two central sources: the science of
genetics and from contemporary culture.170 From this comes the view that religion is to be seen “as
an information system within culture that is part of the effort of nature to understand itself and
conduct itself in freedom.”171
The interrelatedness of all creation is shown time and again by scientific work in genetics.
Indeed, the new DNA discoveries restate with convincing clarity the shared evolutionary heritage
of all living things172 and the constant lifetime interaction between genes and the environment.173
Interacting with the biological sciences as a co-efficient, or at least a vector of force, in influencing
the total development of the individual is the environment—both the cultural and the physical.
Because of the fact that, as cultural beings, individual shape the contexts in which social interactions
occur, they exhibit an inherent capacity for ethical behavior and spiritual development.174 Indeed,
the mystery of the human spirit and the capacity for self-transcendence will never be eliminated by
the New Biology.175
While human nature is illuminated by genetic science, it is not explained totally. The
complexity, transcendence, and mystery of the human person remains and thus serves as a reference
point of intersection between culture and theology as well as the natural sciences.176 A positive force
in contemporary society is to be seen in the new and ongoing dialogue between genetics, molecular
biology, and the theology of human nature which seeks to build upon these very points.177 When
a distinctly religious voice in, for example, medical ethics becomes passive or is lost, this in turn
encourages a form of moral philosophy for the market place and thus places law as the dominant
source of morality.178 It can only be hoped that from this inter-cultural discourse will come new
frameworks for principled decision making which, in turn, promote reasoned and balanced ethical
responses to personal and societal challenges of this age of the New Biology.179

A Papal Clarification
On October 23, 1996, in an address by John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Science, the
Holy Father suggested science and religion are compatible. “Science can purify religion from error
and superstition, religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the
other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish.”180 As to the specific issue of the
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theory of
evolution, the Pope acknowledged that it is “more than just a hypothesis.”181
While not mentioning Charles Darwin by name, the statement is seen nonetheless as advancing
the idea that religious faith and the teaching of evolution can co-exist easily.182 Indeed, while
observing that there are a number of different theories of evolution, the Holy Father, went on to
observe that, “It is possible to accept evolution as a theory while affirming that the spiritual and
philosophical elements must remain outside the competence of science.”183 At least for Roman
Catholic theology, what had been—up to this time—the most significant point of argument and
division between the genetic revolution and theology as a body of thought,184 is no longer in issue.
Today, a consensus has been reached not only among scientists—and biblical scholars, but
mainstream religions and educators as well, that the theory of evolution is a verifiable account of
the origins of life.185 With the Pope’s acceptance of evolution as a theory, comes the realization that,
as such, “Science is not a threat to faith.”186 Accordingly, what John Paul II did was to chart a
middle position between the creationists and evolutionists which, in turn, fosters not only dialogue
but an openness to truth.187

Darwinism and Intelligent Design
In 1991, Philip E. Johnson constructed the philosophical underpinnings of a contemporary
intelligent-design movement which, in essence, asserts the theory of Darwinian evolution is based
on inaccurate assumptions and weak evidence.188 More specifically, the small and vocal number of
biologists, chemists, philosophers and mathematicians who constitute the membership of the
movement, argue that because of the refusal of mainstream science to consider anything but natural
explanations for things, it is therefore biased subjectively against proofs of supernatural intervention
in the evolutionary process. Thus, the efficacy of the evidence for evolution through natural
processes is called in question.189
Proponents of the theory of intelligent design believe, simply, that an intelligent agent (but not
necessarily using the word, God) has guided the history of the earth.190 Criticized as not being a
science, the president of The National Academy of Science has termed intelligent design as nothing
more than a “way of restating creationism in a different formulation.”191
For the vast majority of the scientific community, evolution began billions of years ago and was
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both unsupervised and impersonal. Yet, others find significant gaps in the scientific record that
leave evolution more a theory than a documented fact. Accordingly, they put forth the notion that
the evolution of the species took place over time by the grand design of a transcendent personal
creator. These Creationists also contend that the true age of the earth should, as inferred from the
Bible, be computed in thousands of years—not billions.192
With the publication in 1965 of THE GENESIS FLOOD, the term, “creation science” was
introduced into the American vocabulary.193 Soon thereafter, a whole movement took shape.194
Followers of the creation science movement, termed creationists, adopt the Biblical narrative of the
Book of Genesis as their theory of origin,195 accepting as such the creation of the world by a personal
God.196 For the creationists, only two possible constructs can be employed to resolve the question
of the origin of life and of the universe: theistic and atheistic. In other words, God is acknowledged
as the creator of history or life and seen as a evolutionary dynamic.197
The book of Genesis has not been accepted in the public school classrooms of the Nation as a
teaching source nor has creation science succeeded in re-shaping mainstream science. Indeed, led
by the National Academy of Science, mainstream scientific organizations have rejected totally the
creationist approach.198
Central to the claims of the legitimacy of creationism is an apparent conundrum: normally, if
creationists accept the Bible as true and infallible, why is it regarded as important to link science
with it? The answer given is that since creationism does not qualify as a science in that it does not
afford a set of hypotheses capable of being tested, a higher level of legitimacy is sought for it by
placing science at its heart or as its modus operandi.199 “Modern Americans cling to scientific
rhetoric no matter what the issue.”200 Indeed, “scientific sanctification” validates many conservative
beliefs by attributing scientific credibility to their biblical interpretations.201 What is seen in reality,
then, is that by shifting attention from issues of faith and value to those of scientific interpretation,
the scientific creationists have “reduced the Bible to the level of a science [text].”202
Since mainstream Christians and Jews do not see the Bible and evolutionary theory as
inconsistent, modern creation science is not a contemporary issue of great moment.203 Rather, they
understand that science, itself, can neither tackle and resolve the moral issues of the day nor serve
as a template for living life to the fullest. Put simply, “whether rejected or accepted, evolution
cannot speak to the vital issue of right and wrong.”204
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Scopes and Its Aftermath
When in 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee, a high school science teacher, John T. Scopes, taught a
class on evolutionary theory, a national debate was thereby triggered over the origins of humans
which—in turn—forced the Nation to confront not only its fears and suspicions of scientific
knowledge, but its application and uses as well.205 In essence, the “Scopes Monkey Trial” pitted
religion, and a fundamentalist view of divine creation (e.g., creationism) against scientific thought
on evolution. It became a harbinger of the utilization of evolutionary biology that did not begin
however until after World War II.206
In 1925, the Tennessee Legislature became the first state in the Nation to enact a law against the
teaching of evolution in the public schools. Not only was Darwinism banned, but all teaching
concerned with human evolution as well and criminal sanctions were imposed for violations.
Originally initiated by the ACLU as a means of invalidating the state’s anti-evolution statute as a
violation of the First Amendment, in the end, Scopes lost and was found guilty by a jury and the
court imposed a fine of $100.00. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee went back to the
original legal issue—that is, whether the anti-evolution statute was inconsistent with the state
constitution’s religion clause which forbade preferences being given, by law, “to any religious
establishment or mode of worship.” With but one dissent, the court held that the challenged
legislation was constitutional. Yet, on a technicality, Scope’s conviction was reversed. Since, under
the Tennessee Constitution, any fine greater than $50.00 could be assessed only by a jury, it was
held that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to impose the $100.00 fine.207
The historians of the 1950's and the commentators of the 1930's saw the Scope trial at two levels:
both groups agreed that it was a defeat for fundamentalism, while the commentators of that period
during which the trial occurred saw it as a “media spectacular.”208
In the end, then, perhaps the Scopes trial can be viewed properly as “a step in the triumph of
reason over revelation and science over superstition.”209 Or, stated otherwise, the enduring
importance of Scopes is that it embodied the quintessential “American struggle between individual
liberty and majoritarian democracy, and cast it in the timeless debate over science and religion.”210
The Scopes controversy continues to persist even today.211 It is recast now as creation science (as
opposed to creationism) versus evolution.212
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IV.
A CREATIVE PARTNERSHIP?
Religion, and its denominational theologies, set normative standards for ethical conduct and,
thus, serve as a construct for social decision making. Alternatively, as suggested, these norms and
constructs can be seen properly as a third culture—interpreting, reconciling and stabilizing law and
medical science. Yet, if the view is accepted that the “bedrock of moral order is religion,”213 it must
follow that law and science not only build upon it but are linked irretrievably to it in all of their
present policies and actions.
The alternative hypothesis suggests the synergistic forces of law, religion, and science combine
in a dynamic partnership to form a communitarian alliance dedicated to providing a framework in
which man can pursue the peace of ordered harmony which allows for a balanced happiness in his
social, spiritual, and physical relationships.214 Within the alliance, the rank or equality of status
depends largely upon the frame of reference taken for each problem presented.
Historically, there can be no disputation of the first order significance of the moral and ethical
theories and principles derived from religion. Indeed, it has been suggested that without religious
beliefs, moral teachings merely “hang in the air” without any foundation.215 In contemporary
society, however, law—as has been suggested—must assume the primary role of directing and
stabilizing all courses of human affairs—fortified in interpretative analysis, to be sure, by ethical and
moral principles. In public matters, however, if not a Jeffersonian “wall of separation” between
matters of church and state, then at least a Madisonian “scrupulous neutrality” must be maintained
if faithfulness to the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is to be respected.216
While Americans believe in “The Living Constitution” as a “morphing document” evolving from
age to age according to majority wishes217—expressed and manifested ideally, as such, through a
“deliberative” democratic process218 (sadly, not guided by informed judgment)—the central
weakness to this theory of living constitutionalism is that there is no one guiding principle for it to
follow.219 In contemporary issues of bio-medicine, there is little “rational” deliberation by the
populace. This condition, in turn, forces the judiciary—as interpreters of the laws and the social
conscious—to define and inevitably test current medico-legal issues by the text and legislative
history of the Constitution thereby providing, ideally, both predictably and stability to both an
evolving and highly contentious area of the law.220
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Compatibilities and Incompatibilities
The duality of man or the recognition of his spiritual and material sides, has not been the grounds
upon which contemporary science has advanced. Rather than challenge and attack this concept,
science has merely set it aside and defined as non-scientific all inquiries into spiritual matters.221
As the scientific dialogue has assumed increasingly that man is no more than matter and energy,
dualism has nearly disappeared.222 Yet, throughout modern science, there remains a continuing
search for an intersection point between values and empiricism.223
Perhaps the noblest and most practical point of balance between religion and science should be
love, justice or humaneness—for its achievement by man promotes the essence of faith by instilling
meaning and value to the life-experience and also enhances one’s overall physical well being.
Stated otherwise, the fulcrum of this balancing test between religion and science is the achievement
of a point of equilibrium that promotes policies and shapes direct actions that minimize suffering
and improve the social well-being of all men.224
There is a common misperception that religion needs only faith in order to sustain itself. The
correct understanding is that “religion requires belief and belief is built on knowledge.”225 Within
differing contexts, both science and theology, then, seek truth and wise judgment.226

Toward Reconciliation
Not every scientist must become a believer nor every believer embrace science totally in order
for there to be a reconciliation between science and faith. While viewed from vastly different
perspectives, the biblical and the scientific description of the creation of the universe and the
beginning of life or earth present identical realities. Once these perspectives are identified, they can
coexist rather comfortably. If an acceptance of the need to read and understand the Bible on the
Bible’s terms—complete with subtextual levels of interpretation—is understood and science then
admits it is powerless to either confirm or deny a purpose for life, a true reconciliation between
science and faith will be achieved.227
Scientific investigation is in fact very similar to religious experience. In science, the defining
event is when that which was unknown becomes visible and even clear. In spirituality, experiences
with meaning, purpose, and teleology are foundational. Thus, semantic differences remain small
between scientific insight and what is termed—in the language of religion—revelation.228
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CONCLUSION
Shaping a Unified Goal and Response
The theologies of the world religions not only demand an answer but also prompt a response to
the problem of suffering—for they assist in seeking an explanation to, or rationalization of,
suffering. In one very real sense, then, the New Biology is considered properly as a theological
response to the enigma of human suffering. The medical scientists and physicians endeavor to cure.
Through therapeutics and investigation, the purpose of religion and medical science is the same: to
minimize or ameliorate suffering.229
It remains ultimately for law to serve as a primary mechanism for effecting this duality of
purpose through wise and humane legislation, administrative policy making, and judicial
interpretations designed to assume both distributive and corrective justice in the delivery of health
care and the advancement of medical science230 which, in turn, promote the personal dignity, value
and integrity of the human person.231

Law’s Challenge and The Kirby Ideal
In the “dreamtime” of tomorrow, comparative jurisprudence and international law—together
with a reliance on interdisciplinary disciplines—will be the touchstones for contemporary
lawmaking which seeks to both elevate and thereby validate the nobility of the human purpose and
protect its free and oftentimes diverse exercise;232 eschews parochial strait jackets and, instead,
codifies humanistic values;233 and, furthermore, recognizes its compass must always point to the
advancement of human rights.234
If lawyers are to continue to play a relevant role in the “dreamtime,” they must become more
aware of the nature and consequences of the scientific and technological advances of the Age.235
Otherwise, they will not only “increasingly lack understanding of the questions to be asked, let alone
the answers to be given.”236 For, it is well to remember that “doing nothing has just as many
consequences as doing something.”237
“Unless interdisciplinary machinery can be developed, capable of consulting the experts and the
general community and helping [legislatures] with social and legal implications of medical
developments,” we must then be forced to acknowledge the inability of democratic institutions to
respond to the challenges of science and technology—unmistakenly “the great engines” of the 21st
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Century.238
It is well to remember that even though science promises an unpredictable future, futures are
inevitably unpredictable.239
The most fundamental lesson to be learned from the march of science and technology, then, is
that in order to foresee development of the future, controlled leaps of the imagination must be
engaged in.240
In the final analysis, the observations of Justice Kirby are pertinent:
“If democracy is to be more than a myth and a shibboleth in the age of natural
science and technology and more than a triennial visit to a polling booth, we need a
new institutional response.”241
—a response that is both informed and guided by the Kirby Ethic that I have delineated previously.
If we fail in this challenge, Justice Kirby continues, “we must simply resign ourselves to being
taken” where the machines of science and technology move us.242 Such a pathway “may involve
nothing less than the demise of the Rule of Law as we know it.”243
It is for “society to decide whether there is an alternative or whether the dilemmas posed by
modern science and technology, particularly in bioethics, are just too painful, technical, complicated,
sensitive and controversial for our institutions of government.”244
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